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1 Introduction
The notion of Internal Violence is a wide-ranging view that encompasses internal armed
conflicts, criminality, terrorism and political violence. The idea of Internal Violence is
thus broader than the concepts of civil war or political violence as traditionally conceived
in economic growth models. In many growth models, violence is only confined to civil
war or political violence, each of which analyzed separately. The view point of Internal
Violence is that all forms of violence can hinder economic performance in general and
economic growth in particular. In fact, any possible combination of these four elements
listed above can potentially harm economic growth. Thismay not be transparent inmany
developed countries where violence is, in most cases, low. But in developing countries,
and particularly in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), where violence, in various forms,
is intense and prevalent, we can observe, in many cases, that economic activity is ham-
pered by violence. Therefore, to account for a more complete and broad notion, it is
important to combine the four elements into a single measurement and study its impact
on growth. High Internal Violence destroys physical and human capital, hampers the
welfare of societies, augments capital flight and brain drain, reduces efficiency and total
factor productivity, increases mortality, lessens consumption and investment, . . . , all of
which negatively influence the growth rate.
Collier (1999) is one of the pioneering works on the effects of civil war on economic
growth. He found that civil war has huge impacts on the composition and the level of
GDP. Civil war causes growth to shrink by 2.2%. This, because civil war decreases GDP
and engenders a continuous loss of capital stock by devastation, reduction of savings and
capital flight. The impact of civil war on economic activity is not uniform. Sectors that
are intensive in capital and transactions diminishmore quicklywhile thosewith differing
features grow rapidly.
Bodea and Elbadawi (2008) use a two-step procedure to examine the effect of orga-
nized political violence on economic growth. In the first step, they separately compute
three measurements of political violence (riots, coups and civil war) by employing a
multinomial model. In the second step, they utilize a dynamic panel data GMM estima-
tion method to analyze the impact of their separate predicted probabilities of political
violence on growth. They discover that organized political violence, particularly civil
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war, harms long-run economic growth.
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) is one of the seminal studies on the consequences
of terrorism on economic performance in general and on foreign direct investment in
particular. They performboth theoretical and empirical analyses. Their theoreticalmodel
demonstrates that, despite being a small portion of the total economic risk, terrorismhave
a huge effect on the distribution of capital between economies. Terrorism diminishes the
anticipated return on investment in addition to augmenting uncertainty. Consequently,
if the global economy is appropriately integrated allowing financiers to branch out other
kinds of nation state risks, variations in the magnitude of terrorism engender huge
relocations of capital between nations. Their econometric estimations show that, despite
taking into account other kinds of nation state risks, terrorism generates a fall in net
foreign direct investment. They find that the impact of terrorism is very high because net
foreign direct investment drops by 5% of GDP if the terrorism risk rises by one standard
deviation.
Detotto and Otranto (2010) use a state space technique to examine the impact of crime
on economic growth. They discovered that crime hinders economic growth. They found
that economic growth in a month falls by 0.00040% if the crime rate increases by 1%.
Their estimations additionally demonstrate that the economic costs of crime show a very
important static element.
Similarly to the works cited above, this paper examines the connection between inter-
nal armed conflicts, criminality, terrorism, political violence and economic growth. But
instead of analyzing the individual effect of each of the previous elements on growth, it
combines them into a single concept called Internal Violence. It is the first study to merge
all these four elements in a single notion and explore its impact on economic growth
both theoretically and empirically. Specifically, it makes several contributions. On the
theoretical side, this paper is the first to introduce a fully-micro-founded endogenous
economic growth model that illustrates the explicit effect of Internal Violence on long-
run growth in a stochastic dynamic optimization in continuous time framework. On
the empirical side, the paper has many innovations. First, we use the new database on
the Internal Violence Index (IVI) created by Feindouno, Goujon and Wagner (2016) to
empirically capture the notion of Internal Violence. Second, since we are dealing with
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cross-section data for the Internal Violence Index (IVI), we employ Linear Regressions
and Instrumental Variables Estimations techniques to perform our growth regressions.
The instrumental variables estimations employ an external instrument instead of internal
instruments generally used in this literature. This theoretical model, this variable and
instrumental variable have not been used in previous studies. The theoretical endoge-
nous growth model demonstrates that Internal Violence decreases economic growth.
The econometric results confirm the theoretical previsions that Internal Violence affects
growth negatively. This result remains unchanged when we perform various robust-
ness checks including: heteroscedasticity corrections, alternative measurements of the
Internal Violence Index (IVI), subsamples of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) andNon
Least Developed Countries, and instrumental variables estimations techniques.
The remaining of the paper is organized in the following manner: the first section
presents some stylized facts, the second gives the theoretical model, the third section
exposes the empirical investigations and the last part concludes.
4
2 Stylized Facts
In this section, we provide some stylized facts on the relationship between Internal
Violence and economic growth.
Figure 1 gives the real GDP per capita level1 during the civil wars in Liberia and
Burundi respectively. For Liberia, the graph is relative to the first Liberian civil war that
took place from 1989 to 1997. For Burundi, the graph is relative to the Burundian civil
war that happened from 1993 until 2005. Mostly, in both graphics, we observe that the
level of real GDP per capita is falling at high rates during the years of civil war. This
gives us an evidence that civil war, in particular, and Internal Violence, in general, reduce
growth drastically. We will show later in the text, that this stylized fact is something that
our theoretical model is able to predict.
Figure 2 exhibits the real GDP per capita growth rate in function of the Internal
Violence Index (IVI). The first graph gives a linear fit while the second provides a non-
parametric fit. Both graphics clearly illustrate that there exists a negative connection
between the real GDP per capita growth rate and the Internal Violence Index (IVI). This
means that an increase in Internal Violence tends to be associated with a decrease in the
growth rate. Wewill show below, that this stylized fact is something that our econometric
estimations are able to demonstrate.
3 Theoretical Model
In this section, we expose the theoretical model and illustrate how the main equations
are obtained.
3.1 Model Specification
Our model is an extension of Barro (1990) model to a continuous time stochastic frame-
work. The model presumes identical individuals, meaning that they have similar prefer-
ence parameters. Therefore, we can employ the representative-agent hypothesis within
which the analysis is done from the decisions of one agent. The agent picks out a con-
1In purchasing power parity (PPP).
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sumption path that maximizes the expected value of the present value of his lifetime
utility function2 subject to some dynamic and other constraints, and the initial value of
capital stock. His optimization program is given by:
Max
c(t)
E0
(∫ ∞
0
eρ(−t)c(t)γ
γ
dt
)
(1)
Subject to:
dk(t) =
(
A(1 − τ)g(t)αk(t)1−α − c(t) − δk(t)
)
dt − Aσ(1 − τ)g(t)αk(t)1−αdw(t) (2)
g(t) = Aτg(t)αk(t)1−α (3)
And
k(0) = k0 is given
In equation (1), c(t) is consumption, 11−γ measures the constant intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption, ρ represents the subjective rate of time preference. We
have ρ > 0 and 0 < γ < 1. The functional form of the felicity function has also been
considered by Kamien and Schwartz (1991), and Boucekkine, Pintus and Zou (2018).
Equality (2) gives the law of motion of broad capital stock. It is an Ito stochastic
differential equation (SDE) process. In this equation, τ is income tax, A is total factor
productivity, k(t) is broad capital stock (physical and human capitals among others), g(t)
is productive government spending, w(t) is a Wiener Process and σ is the volatility or
instability of broad capital stock. In this SDE, the drift term says that broad capital stock
increases through an augmentation of production3minus consumption and depreciation.
The diffusion term, demonstrates that broad capital stock is reduced by Internal Violence.
Here Internal Violence is modeled as an unfortunate random outcome that negatively
affect broad capital stock. Hence, the reduction effect ismodeledby thenegativediffusion.
Since Internal Violence is composed of internal armed conflicts, criminality, terrorism
and political violence, it continuously exerts a negative effect on broad capital. In fact,
when there is Internal Violence, for example civil war, terrorism, riots, criminality, . . . ,
in developing countries, assets of many kinds are destroyed and expropriated; skilled
people are killed; people flee the country; roads, buildings and factories are demolished;
2The agent lives forever.
3Output exhibits constant returns to scale to broad capital stock and productive government spending
together but is decreasing returns to scale in each factor taken separately.
6
financial assets flee the country; saving and investment are lessened; etc. All these
factors make that broad capital stock is continuously and constantly reduced by Internal
Violence since this concept contains many subcomponents: internal armed conflicts,
criminality, terrorism and political violence. The addition of the impacts of each of these
subcomponents makes that their cumulative effects are continuous and negative. This
is captured in our model specification by the Wiener Process which is a continuous-time
and continuous-state random process. Indeed, a Wiener Process w(µ, σ) with drift µ and
diffusion σ has its state at time t following N
(
µt, σ
√
t
)
. This is also whywe did not model
equation (2) as jump process. In equation (2), we assume the following conditions on the
parameters: 0 < α < 1, 0 < δ < 1, 0 < τ < 1 and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. The next expression (3) tells us
that productive government spending is financed by income tax, which is the constant
tax rate, τ, multiplied by output,Ag(t)αk(t)1−α. The last expression says that initial capital
stock, k0, is given. Labor supply is inelastic and constant. We assume L (t) = 1, thus all
variables are expressed in per capita term.
In order to solve the above model, we will adopt the social planner solution method.
To this end, we solve for g(t) in equation (3) and substitute in equality (2).
dk(t) =
(
(τ − 1)τ α1−α
(
−A 11−α
)
k(t) − c(t) − δk(t)
)
dt + σ(τ − 1)τ α1−αA 11−α k(t)dw(t) (4)
This allows us to write the Stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equation for
our model:
(5)
ρV(k(t)) =Max
c(t)
(
V′(k(t))
(
(τ − 1)τ α1−α
(
−A 11−α
)
k(t) − c(t) − δk(t)
)
+
1
2
σ2(τ − 1)2τ 2α1−αA 21−α k(t)2V′′(k(t)) + c(t)
γ
γ
)
In this last equation, V(k(t)) is the Value Function of Bellman. The other variables and
parameters are defined as above.
3.2 Economic Equilibrium
Taking the first order conditions of equation (5), we get:
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c(t) = V′(k(t))
1
γ−1 (6)
Replacing this expression in equality (5) and simplifying, we obtain:
(7)2
k(t)
((
τ
1
1−α − τ α1−α
)
A
1
1−α + δ
)
V′(k(t)) +
(γ − 1)V′(k(t))
γ
γ−1
γ
+ ρV(k(t))

= σ2(τ − 1)2τ− 2αα−1A− 2α−1 k(t)2V′′(k(t))
As in Boucekkine et al. (2018), we will choose this functional form for our guess of
the solution of the previous equation.
V(k(t)) =
Ω1−γk(t)γ
γ
(8)
Substituting this function in equality (7) and doing lots of algebra and simplifications,
we find:
Ω =
1
1
2γσ
2(τ − 1)2τ− 2αα−1A− 2α−1 − γ(τ−1)τ
α
1−αA
1
1−α
γ−1 +
γδ+ρ
1−γ
(9)
This value of Ω allows us to find the equations of interest in our study after many
tedious algebra, substitutions and simplifications. Hence, the Ito process stochastic
differential equation (SDE) for broad capital stock is given by:
dk(t) = −
k(t)
(
Ω
(
τ
1
1−α − τ α1−α
)
A
1
1−α + δΩ+ 1
)
Ω
dt + σ(τ − 1)τ α1−αA 11−α k(t)dw(t) (10)
where k(0) = k0. Similarly, the Ito process for consumption is:
dc(t) = −
c(t)
(
Ω
(
τ
1
1−α − τ α1−α
)
A
1
1−α + δΩ+ 1
)
Ω
dt + σ(τ − 1)τ α1−αA 11−α c(t)dw(t) (11)
where c(0) = k0
Ω
. Equation (11) gives us the expression for the growth rate in our
economy. From this equality,we see that the growth rate is functionof only theparameters
of the model, time and the Wiener process. Hence the growth rate is endogenous in
the sense that it is engendered from inside the system as a direct outcome of internal
mechanisms. It changes as time varies and it is stochastic.
By the same token, the equation for the Value Function is provided by:
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(12)
dV(t)
=
γV(t)
(
(τ − 1)Ωτ− 2αα−1A− 2α−1
(
(γ − 1)σ2(τ − 1) − 2τ αα−1A 1α−1
)
− 2δΩ − 2
)
2Ω
dt
+ γσ(τ − 1)τ α1−αA 11−αV(t)dw(t)
where V(0) =
Ω1−γkγ
0
γ .
3.3 Numerical Simulations
In order to perform the numerical experiments, we first calibrate the parameters. We
take these parameters mostly from the literature. δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.02 and α = 0.67 are
from Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004). A = 1 and k0 = 2 are normalizations. τ = 0.25 is
set to be similar to the ratio of tax revenues over GDP as in most countries in the World.
γ = 13 is computed from the survey of Thimme (2017). We set the volatility or instability
of broad capital stock to σ = 0.75 because broad capital stock is highly volatile in periods
of intense violence as typically is the case in most developing countries.
From these calibrated values of the parameters and variables, we numerically checked
that the transversality condition for our model is verified and satisfied. That is:
lim
t→∞
E(V(k(t), t)) = lim
t→∞
E
(
eρ(−t)V(k(t))
)
= 0 (13)
Figure 3 gives the evolution of broad capital stock (equation (10)) through time. We
simulate 3 realizations of the trajectories for convenience. We see that broad capital stock
is falling. The model clearly predicts what we expected. That is, when there is Internal
Violence, buildings, roads, factories, . . . , are destroyed; qualifiedpeople are killed; people
flee the country; financial capital flees abroad; saving and investment are reduced; etc.
All these factors make that broad capital stock shrinks and falls. This is what this figure
is illustrating.
Figure 4 provides the evolution of consumption (equation (11)) through time. As
previously, we simulate 3 realizations of the trajectories. We observe that consumption
is falling during periods of Internal Violence. This happens because when there is high
Internal Violence, broad capital stock falls; saving and investment diminish; economic
agents are uncertain about the future; etc. All these factors cause consumption to plunge.
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This feature of the theoretical model is what we illustrated in our stylized facts in fig-
ure 1. This also happens because mean consumption is diminishing and its variance
(uncertainty) is augmenting as illustrated in figure 5.
The Value Function is, to some extent, related to theWelfare of the agent in our model
since it represents the choice of the agent of a consumption path that maximizes the
expected value of the present value of his lifetime utility function. Figure 6 gives the
evolution of the Value Function (equation (12)) through time. As before, we simulate 3
realizationsof the trajectories. Here alsoweperceive that theValueFunction isdecreasing.
This is an indication that when there is Internal Violence, the Welfare of the citizens in
the country is, to a certain degree, deteriorating.
4 Empirical Investigations
This section presents the estimationmethods, the data and variables, and the econometric
results.
4.1 Estimation Methods
To empirically analyze the effect of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) on growth, we
estimate the following econometric model:
grgdpcapi = µ0 + φ ln
(
gdpcapi,0
)
+ α IVIi + β
′xi + εi (14)
where grgdpcapi is the growth rate of real GDP per capita; ln
(
gdpcapi,0
)
pinpoints the
logarithm of the initial value of real GDP per capita; IVIi is the Internal Violence Index
(IVI); xi illustrates a vector of control variables: logarithm of general government final
consumption expenditures over GDP, logarithm of openness (exports + imports over
GDP), logarithm of terms of trade (exports prices over imports prices), logarithm of 1
+ the inflation rate, logarithm of domestic credit to private sector over GDP (financial
development), initial human capital, reciprocal of initial life expectancy, logarithm of
initial fertility rate and democratic accountability; εi is the error term; i specifies the
countries.
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Since the data on the Internal Violence Index (IVI) is a cross-section database, we
use ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables regressions techniques to
estimate equation (14). These two estimation methods, particularly the instrumental
variables technique, allow us to consistently estimate the impact of the Internal Violence
Index (IVI) on economic growth. We suspect Internal Violence to be an endogenous vari-
able. We think that there might be a reverse causality going from economic performance
to Internal Violence. For instance, bad economic performance can lead to high Internal
Violence. To instrument Internal Violence, we employ the fact that we have two indepen-
dent measurements of Internal Violence both measured with errors. In fact, when there
is Internal Violence like civil war, it becomes very difficult and problematic to accurately
measure economic aggregates including violence itself. Thismakes that Internal Violence
is measured with some degree of noise in the data, hence with errors. To consistently
estimate the impact of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) on economic growth we use the
fact that we have two independent measurements on Internal Violence: the first coming
from Feindouno et al. (2016) and the second coming from the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG). We then instrument the first measurement by the second. Below, we give
more details on how each of these two variables is computed. For more details on this
instrumentation technique, see Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Wooldridge (2013).
4.2 Data and Variables
The Internal Violence Index (IVI) data are created by Feindouno et al. (2016) at the FERDI
(Fondation pour les E´tudes et Recherches sur le De´veloppement International). It is
a blended quantitative measurement. It is comprised of four main clusters: internal
armed conflicts, criminality, terrorism, and political violence. The internal armed con-
flicts cluster includes the following variables: deaths due internal armed conflicts and
internally displaced people. The criminality cluster is composed of homicides. The ter-
rorism cluster contains: terrorist incidents, deaths due to terrorism and injuries due to
terrorism. The political violence cluster comprehends: assassinations, purges and riots.
This dataset captures the notion of Internal Violence we theorized earlier because it en-
compasses internal armed conflicts, criminality, terrorism, and political violence. All the
four elementary components are regularized according to a min-max technique to obtain
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four measures that vary between 0 and 100. This implies that the composite Internal
Violence Index (IVI) also varies between 0 and 100. Three weighting schemes are used
to compute three measurements of the Internal Violence Index (IVI). The first utilizes a
modest arithmetic average with the identical mass of 0.25 allocated to the four clusters
and the similar weight given to the constituents in every cluster. The corresponding vari-
able is named in this paper as Internal Violence Index 1. The second measurement gives
unevenmasses for the variables in clusters 1, 3, and 4 while keeping equivalent masses at
cluster level. The corresponding variable is named in this paper as Internal Violence Index
2. The third measurement employs a quadratic average to compute scores at the cluster
level while preserving equal masses at clusters and variables levels. The corresponding
variable is named in this paper as Internal Violence Index 3. See Feindouno et al. (2016) for
more additional details on how each of these three measures are calculated.
Our second measurement of Internal Violence comes from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG). In this database, it is called Internal Conflict. We use this variable as
an instrument in our regressions. This variable varies between 0 and 12. It is composed
of the following subparts: Civil War/Coup Threat; Terrorism/Political Violence; and Civil
Disorder. We observe that this variable also captures the notion of Internal Violence we
theorized earlier. See the ICRGMethodologydocumentation available through the Internet
for more additional details on how this variable is computed.
The sample of study is a cross-section data that contain 77 developing countries from
2008 to 2012 with 23 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 54 Non Least Developed
Countries. The choice of the sample is based on the availability of data, the choice of the
variables of the study and because the Internal Violence Index (IVI) is available only for
developing countries. The data essentially come from the World Bank (World Develop-
ment Indicators, 2014), the Fondationpour les E´tudes etRecherches sur leDe´veloppement
International (FERDI, 2016), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2014) and the
Penn World Tables 8.0.
4.3 Econometric Results
In this part, we will present the main estimation results and the robustness analysis.
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4.3.1 Main Estimation Results
Table 1 gives the estimation results of the relationship between the Internal Violence
Index (IVI) and growth without correction of heteroskedasticity for all countries. In
this table, the coefficient of initial real GDP per capita is significant and negative in all
regressions. The negative coefficient indicates conditional convergence with respect to
real GDP per capita. This convergence is conditional in that it concludes that the growth
rate of real GDP per capita is bigger the initial real GDP per capita is small, only if the
other regressors are kept constant. The coefficient indicates that conditional convergence
is very high because it is carried out at a rate of 1.40% per year4. All eight equations show
that the Internal Violence Index is statistically significant at all conventional levels and
have the expected sign. This implies that an augmentation of the Internal Violence Index
diminishes the growth rate. The above-mentioned results, empirically corroborate what
we have found in the theoretical part. Specifically, this means that when there is high
Internal Violence, broad capital stock falls; saving and investment diminish; economic
agents are uncertain about the future; etc. All these factors cause the growth rate to
plunge. This feature of the estimations results is what we illustrated in our stylized
facts in figure 2. Our findings illustrate that, the negative effect of the Internal Violence
Index on growth is robust to the introduction of different control variables. In fact,
through the eight equations we have varied the introduction of the control variables
but the coefficient of the Internal Violence Index retains its expected sign and is always
statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect of the Internal Violence Index on
growth is very high. Referring to regression (4), a rise in the Internal Violence Index
by 100 percentage point decreases the growth rate by 3.53 percentage points. This is
a very high value, suggesting that the Internal Violence Index has a huge diminishing
impact on growth. This outcome suggests that reducing Internal Violence stimulates
growth. We observe that the standard errors of the coefficients of the Internal Violence
Index are relatively small. This implies that the corresponding confidence intervals,
though not reported, are tinier meaning that the coefficients of the Internal Violence
Index are estimated with great precision. The number of observations are stable in all
eight equations, hence the phenomenon we are studying covers most of our sample. The
4From equation (5).
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R-squared is reasonable in all equations. Fertility and the reciprocal of life expectancy
negatively affect growth while democracy and terms of trade enhance growth. These last
outcomes was found by many empirical growth studies.
Now we turn to the usual tests in linear regressions. All tests use equation (3) of
Table 1. The Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality give us an adjusted chi2(2) statistic
of 4.01 with a p-value of 0.1345. We cannot therefore reject the normality assumption of
the residuals. The White’s test for heteroskedasticity provides a chi2(35) statistic of 35.34
with a p-value of 0.4523. We see that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedas-
ticity. Nevertheless, we use White’s method of correction for heteroskedasticity, in the
subsequent estimations, for safety reasons, since White’s test is not very powerful (a bit
favorable toH0). This correction does notmodify the coefficients obtained byOLS but, on
the other hand, we have corrected Student tees without bias. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman
augmented regression test for endogeneity 5 gives an F(1, 55) = 0.00 with a p-value of
0.9818. The large p-value specifies that OLS is not inconsistent. This test demonstrates
that the Internal Violence Index (IVI) is not endogenous in our sample. This result shows
that the very strong link between the Internal Violence Index (IVI) and growth is not due
to the simultaneity bias. Nonetheless, we correct for endogeneity in the robustness sub-
section since endogeneity might also be an economic hypothesis problem. The Ramsey
RESET test for the detection of a bad specification of the functional form as well as the
omission of relevant variables provides an F(21, 35) = 0.91 with a p-value of 0.5849. This
result illustrates that we cannot reject the hypothesis of a good specification of the model.
We utilize the successive Chow test6 to detect an endogenous break point. The command
objectively told us that there is no break point at all conventional significance levels in
our sample.
Table 2 provides the regressionswith correction of heteroskedasticity. In this Table, we
have changed the specifications of the individual equations compared to Table 1 in order
to control for the robustness of our estimations to the introduction of different control
variables. Similar to Table 1, we see that there is conditional convergence in all equations.
As in the first Table, the Internal Violence Index (IVI) have a negative and statistically
5Sometimes also called Nakamura Nakamura’s test.
6I introduce a new Stata command named suchowtest for performing this test. The command is download-
able at: https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457536.html.
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significant coefficient in all estimations. This demonstrates that Internal Violence harms
economic growth even if we take heteroskedasticity into account. Thus correcting for
heteroskedasticity does not alter our main results we found in the first Table. The initial
fertility rate continues to negatively affect growth while democratic accountability and
terms of trade still boost economic growth. The number of observations is stable in all
regressions and the R-squared is fairly acceptable.
4.3.2 Robustness Analysis
In Table 3, we give the estimation results using the alternative measures of the Internal
Violence Index (IVI). In this Table, we have included one by one the alternative mea-
surements of the Internal Violence Index (IVI). We see that all the two Internal Violence
Index (IVI) variables affect negatively and significantly economic growth. As in the first
two Tables, the effect of Internal Violence is very high and is approximately similar to
its magnitudes we found in those Tables. The coefficients remain approximately stable
across all two equations. The number of countries are comparable to the ones we have
in Table 2. The initial GDP per capita and the initial fertility rate are still statistically
significant, and keep their expected respective signs. The results found here suggest that
changing the way the Internal Violence Index (IVI) is computed does not change the
conclusions we found in Table 1 and 2.
Table 4 presents the results of the estimations for the Least Developed Countries
(LDCs). Similarly to the previous regressions, the Internal Violence Index (IVI) influences
negatively economic growth. As in the main estimations, the effect of Internal Violence
is very high. Referring to equation (6), we observe that the magnitude of the impact
of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) has approximately doubled compared to the main
estimations. Consequently, Internal Violence is very harmful to the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs). The coefficients of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) are roughly stable
in all eight equations. According to many statisticians, the overall rule of thumb is
that we must have approximately at least 10 to 20 observations per estimated coefficient
in a regression. Hence the number of countries for our Least Developed Countries
(LDCs) sample is fairly reasonable and acceptable. The results for the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) corroborates those found in our main regressions. The initial fertility
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rate continues to have a negative impact on growth. There is no conditional convergence
among the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
Table 5 gives the regressions for the Non Least Developed Countries (NLDCs).
The results in this Table illustrate that the Internal Violence Index (IVI) acts negatively
and significantly on growth in the Non Least Developed Countries (NLDCs). As in
the main estimations, we observe that the effect of the Internal Violence Index (IVI)
is very large. The number of observations is fairly big and stable. We thus have a
good representative subsample. As in the main regressions, the initial fertility rate and
the reciprocal of life expectancy affect growth negatively while the terms of trade exert
a positive impact on economic growth. Contrarily to the Least Developed Countries
(LDCs), there is conditional convergence among the Non Least Developed Countries
(NLDCs). The results we found in the main estimations are thus maintained for the Non
Least Developed Countries (NLDCs).
Table 6 gives the instrumental variables estimations results for all countries with
the variable Internal Violence Index 3. The results of the Underidentification test statistic
illustrate that all our equations are identified. This means that the excluded instrument is
pertinent, implying that it is linked with the endogenous variable. The Weak identifica-
tion test shows that the identification is strong as the F statistic is above 10% of OLS bias.
Hence our excluded instrument is not weakly correlatedwith the endogenous regressor7.
The Hansen J statistic is not reported because it is always zero since our model is exactly
identified. This is because we use only one instrument. The number of observations is
large and stable in all equations. All eight equations in Table 6 show that the Internal
Violence Index (IVI) is statistically significant at all conventional levels and have the
expected negative sign. We observe that the effect of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) is
too high. Referring to regression (4), a rise in the Internal Violence Index (IVI) by 100
percentage point decreases the growth rate by 5.04 percentage points. This is 1.43 times
larger thanwhat we had in the estimations without correction of heteroskedasticity. Con-
sequently, our instrumentation technique might reduce the attenuation bias. We observe
that the standard errors of the coefficients of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) are very
small. This implies that the corresponding confidence intervals, though not reported,
7The first-stage regressions results are available upon request.
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are tinier meaning that the coefficients of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) are estimated
with great precision. The use of instrumental variables in the estimations makes it pos-
sible to say that the negative relationship between the Internal Violence Index (IVI) and
economic growth seems to go from the Internal Violence Index (IVI) towards growth
and not the reverse. Our estimations corroborate those found in the literature of civil
war and political violence by using a different broader measurement of Violence, and
also an instrumental variable regression technique. As in the main estimations, there is
conditional convergence in all equations. The reciprocal of life expectancy continues to
harm growth while democratic accountability still boosts economic growth.
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5 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between the Internal Violence Index (IVI) and
economic growth both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical part shows that an
increase in Internal Violence hinders the growth rate in the centralized economy. Using
Linear Regressions and Instrumental Variables Estimations techniques, we find that the
InternalViolence Index (IVI) has a strongnegative impact ongrowth. A rise in the Internal
Violence Index (IVI) by 100 percentage point decreases the growth rate by 5.04 percentage
points. The use of instrumental variables in the estimations makes it possible to say that
the negative relationship between the Internal Violence Index (IVI) and economic growth
seems to go from the Internal Violence Index (IVI) towards growth and not the reverse.
The robustness checks illustrate that the negative impact of the Internal Violence Index
(IVI) on growth is stable to the use of alternative measurements of the Internal Violence
Index (IVI) and on subsamples of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Non Least
Developed Countries (NLDCs).
Though the results found were informative, some extensions could be made. If panel
data of the Internal Violence Index (IVI) were available, we could use Large Hetero-
geneous Cross-Sectionally Dependent Panel Data Estimations Methods to empirically
analyze the impact of Internal Violence on growth. Concerning the theoretical model, a
jump-diffusion model could also give us more insights on how Internal Violence affects
growth. These avenues of research are left for our future studies.
From economic policy perspectives, the results illustrate that Internal Violence could
have negative impacts on growth and that efforts made to reduce it might relaunch
saving, investment and growth.
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Figure 1: Real GDP per Capita Level during Civil War
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Figure 2: Real GDP per Capita Growth Rate in Function of the Internal Violence Index
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Figure 4: Evolution of Consumption
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Figure 5: Evolution of the Moments of Consumption
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Figure 6: Evolution of the Value Function
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Table 1: Regressions without Correction of Heteroskedasticity
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial GDP per Capita -0.0103*** -0.00612** -0.0109*** -0.0103*** -0.0135*** -0.0102*** -0.0104*** -0.0111***
(0.00344) (0.00303) (0.00334) (0.00335) (0.00331) (0.00313) (0.00313) (0.00339)
Internal Violence Index 3 -0.0317** -0.0327** -0.0346** -0.0353** -0.0270* -0.0317** -0.0336** -0.0323**
(0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0152) (0.0161) (0.0136) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0144)
Initial Fertility Rate -0.0345*** -0.0379*** -0.0299*** -0.0425*** -0.0342*** -0.0420*** -0.0445***
(0.0100) (0.0136) (0.0109) (0.00983) (0.00938) (0.0121) (0.0132)
Government Consumption 0.00101 0.00411
(0.00975) (0.00994)
Openness -0.00348 -0.00304 -0.00352 -0.00230
(0.00678) (0.00686) (0.00671) (0.00681)
Democratic Accountability 0.00349* 0.00414* 0.00381* 0.00364* 0.00458** 0.00353* 0.00368* 0.00362*
(0.00204) (0.00211) (0.00200) (0.00203) (0.00196) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00202)
Reciprocal of Life Expectancy -3.087* -1.287 -1.247
(1.643) (1.682) (1.695)
Inflation 0.0797 0.0161 0.0362
(0.0788) (0.0779) (0.0753)
Financial Development 0.00379 -0.00579 -0.00559 -0.00646
(0.00477) (0.00567) (0.00543) (0.00551)
Terms of Trade 0.0161**
(0.00732)
Constant 0.140*** 0.113** 0.159*** 0.150*** 0.164*** 0.136*** 0.140*** 0.157***
(0.0495) (0.0438) (0.0446) (0.0442) (0.0352) (0.0344) (0.0346) (0.0504)
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.267 0.187 0.286 0.275 0.320 0.267 0.280 0.281
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2: Regressions with Correction of Heteroskedasticity
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial GDP per Capita -0.0105*** -0.0104*** -0.0111** -0.0111*** -0.0116*** -0.0110** -0.0138*** -0.0125***
(0.00349) (0.00340) (0.00425) (0.00333) (0.00368) (0.00458) (0.00406) (0.00418)
Internal Violence Index 3 -0.0317* -0.0336* -0.0323* -0.0338** -0.0301* -0.0326* -0.0296* -0.0330*
(0.0168) (0.0192) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0167) (0.0189) (0.0167) (0.0168)
Initial Fertility Rate -0.0422*** -0.0420*** -0.0445*** -0.0387*** -0.0395*** -0.0441*** -0.0492*** -0.0386***
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0132) (0.0117) (0.0102) (0.0146) (0.0130) (0.0138)
Openness -0.00230
(0.00788)
Financial Development -0.00591 -0.00559 -0.00646 -0.00616 -0.00624 -0.00630 -0.00450 -0.00694
(0.00594) (0.00659) (0.00630) (0.00593) (0.00591) (0.00678) (0.00622) (0.00627)
Democratic Accountability 0.00376 0.00368 0.00362 0.00378 0.00341 0.00363 0.00451* 0.00336
(0.00237) (0.00251) (0.00253) (0.00238) (0.00245) (0.00259) (0.00256) (0.00258)
Government Consumption 0.00411 0.00409 0.00274 0.00390
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0113)
Reciprocal of Life Expectancy -1.239 -1.241
(1.289) (1.335)
Initial Human Capital 0.00702 0.00575
(0.00632) (0.00669)
Inflation 0.00703
(0.0797)
Terms of Trade 0.0149**
(0.00640)
Constant 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.157** 0.161*** 0.131*** 0.155** 0.175*** 0.167**
(0.0388) (0.0379) (0.0657) (0.0366) (0.0383) (0.0705) (0.0626) (0.0702)
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.278 0.280 0.281 0.286 0.286 0.281 0.328 0.294
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3: Using Alternative Measurements of Internal Violence
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2)
Initial GDP per Capita -0.0119*** -0.0118***
(0.00423) (0.00424)
Internal Violence Index 2 -0.0318*
(0.0185)
Internal Violence Index 1 -0.0352*
(0.0202)
Reciprocal of Life Expectancy -1.248 -1.213
(1.305) (1.298)
Initial Fertility Rate -0.0409*** -0.0410***
(0.0138) (0.0138)
Government Consumption 0.00535 0.00527
(0.0111) (0.0111)
Financial Development -0.00700 -0.00710
(0.00614) (0.00611)
Democratic Accountability 0.00353 0.00352
(0.00248) (0.00247)
Constant 0.178** 0.177**
(0.0688) (0.0688)
Observations 64 64
R-squared 0.266 0.264
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4: Regressions for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial GDP per Capita -0.00904 -0.00855 -0.00851 -0.00819 -0.00864 -0.00844 -0.00875 -0.00869
(0.0147) (0.0127) (0.0152) (0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0166)
Internal Violence Index 3 -0.0612* -0.0688* -0.0690* -0.0651* -0.0685* -0.0692* -0.0681* -0.0684*
(0.0316) (0.0351) (0.0337) (0.0343) (0.0350) (0.0364) (0.0330) (0.0323)
Initial Human Capital 0.00593 0.00150 0.00120 0.00154
(0.0186) (0.0216) (0.0204) (0.0210)
Reciprocal of Life Expectancy 3.179 2.654 2.653 3.135 2.649 2.661 2.642 2.644
(2.802) (2.442) (2.495) (2.749) (2.736) (2.613) (2.585) (2.600)
Initial Fertility Rate -0.0664*** -0.0739*** -0.0742*** -0.0700*** -0.0734*** -0.0741*** -0.0734*** -0.0735***
(0.0166) (0.0132) (0.0116) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0135) (0.0151) (0.0139)
Government Consumption -0.00793 -0.00661
(0.00951) (0.0108)
Financial Development -0.0163 -0.0184 -0.0186 -0.0172 -0.0184 -0.0184 -0.0183 -0.0184
(0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0113)
Inflation 0.00420 0.00206 0.00314 0.00380
(0.114) (0.128) (0.124) (0.117)
Openness -0.000527 -0.000702 -0.000453 -0.000757
(0.0126) (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0132)
Constant 0.0823 0.125 0.125 0.0958 0.122 0.124 0.123 0.122
(0.130) (0.101) (0.117) (0.139) (0.119) (0.119) (0.0957) (0.115)
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.468 0.456 0.456 0.465 0.457 0.456 0.456 0.457
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5: Regressions for the Non Least Developed Countries (NLDCs)
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial GDP per Capita -0.0156*** -0.0142*** -0.0126*** -0.0108*** -0.00997*** -0.0137*** -0.0140*** -0.0147***
(0.00387) (0.00379) (0.00392) (0.00367) (0.00358) (0.00390) (0.00375) (0.00381)
Internal Violence Index 3 -0.0307* -0.0324* -0.0316* -0.0302* -0.0347* -0.0357** -0.0329* -0.0296*
(0.0172) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0174) (0.0202) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0164)
Reciprocal of Life Expectancy -2.203 -2.792* -3.872* -3.560* -2.426 -2.813* -2.939*
(1.838) (1.640) (2.079) (1.932) (1.616) (1.625) (1.591)
Initial Fertility Rate -0.0366** -0.0320* -0.0394** -0.0319** -0.0324** -0.0331**
(0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0160)
Government Consumption 0.0110 0.00816 0.00532 0.00504 0.00407 0.0111 0.00864 0.00983
(0.0102) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.00955) (0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0107)
Terms of Trade 0.0134* 0.00819
(0.00742) (0.00824)
Financial Development -0.00517 -0.00776 -0.00677 0.00102 -0.00695 -0.00769 -0.00864
(0.00610) (0.00698) (0.00762) (0.00700) (0.00639) (0.00694) (0.00626)
Democratic Accountability 0.00309 0.00279 0.00209 0.00229
(0.00277) (0.00285) (0.00281) (0.00271)
Initial Human Capital 0.00171 0.00123
(0.00795) (0.00802)
Openness -0.00399 -0.00560 -0.00284 -0.00389
(0.00718) (0.00748) (0.00832) (0.00712)
Constant 0.233*** 0.226*** 0.178*** 0.178** 0.171** 0.222*** 0.231*** 0.237***
(0.0647) (0.0652) (0.0547) (0.0694) (0.0681) (0.0651) (0.0577) (0.0637)
Observations 49 54 54 49 49 49 54 54
R-squared 0.352 0.302 0.260 0.249 0.232 0.306 0.302 0.297
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Instrumental Variables Estimations
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Internal Violence Index 3 -0.0463* -0.0436* -0.0412* -0.0504* -0.0463* -0.0441* -0.0408* -0.0436*
(0.0259) (0.0255) (0.0245) (0.0275) (0.0262) (0.0247) (0.0243) (0.0247)
Initial GDP per Capita -0.00684** -0.00617* -0.00765** -0.00596* -0.00640* -0.00697** -0.00718* -0.00661*
(0.00298) (0.00324) (0.00340) (0.00305) (0.00342) (0.00340) (0.00373) (0.00373)
Reciprocal of Life Expectancy -3.842** -3.370** -3.377* -3.963** -3.658* -3.365** -3.110 -3.145*
(1.770) (1.547) (1.738) (1.667) (1.891) (1.650) (1.909) (1.815)
Inflation 0.0947 0.0904 0.0953 0.0920
(0.0920) (0.0923) (0.0958) (0.0962)
Financial Development 0.00345 0.00368 0.00478 0.00401 0.00502
(0.00665) (0.00608) (0.00642) (0.00627) (0.00664)
Democratic Accountability 0.00459* 0.00427* 0.00456* 0.00469* 0.00479* 0.00465* 0.00480* 0.00484*
(0.00257) (0.00236) (0.00250) (0.00262) (0.00277) (0.00251) (0.00266) (0.00267)
Terms of Trade 0.00410 0.00635 0.00324 0.00460 0.00612 0.00717 0.00680
(0.00811) (0.00722) (0.00825) (0.00838) (0.00692) (0.00733) (0.00710)
Government Consumption -0.00495 -0.00604 -0.00498
(0.01000) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Constant 0.131** 0.118** 0.133** 0.121** 0.114 0.123** 0.112 0.106
(0.0505) (0.0484) (0.0513) (0.0503) (0.0710) (0.0507) (0.0708) (0.0704)
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.154 0.180 0.171 0.166 0.158 0.188 0.177 0.192
P-value Underident. LM Stat. 0.000467 0.000241 0.000199 0.000648 0.000399 0.000211 0.000189 0.000179
F Stat. Weak Ident. 27.88 24.37 28.37 23.87 28.49 25.26 28.11 25.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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